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Abstract 
 
A significant proportion of offshore trade with North America is carried in 20 and 40 foot 
marine containers. It would appear logical to use empty international marine containers in 
domestic service if controlled by a Canadian carrier. Until recently this form of cabotage was 
restricted by Canadian customs regulations. This paper examines the environmental impact of 
the cabotage regime on the movement of international containers in Canadian domestic service 
and how these regulations influenced supply chain efficiencies. The discussion begins with a 
historical perspective and theoretical underpinning, followed by a comparison of North 
American container regulations. A review of global reforms and contemporary perspectives on 
cabotage regulations is provided, followed by a chronology of Canadian container regulatory 
reform. An economic framework and method of analysis is presented and three case studies are 
examined to illustrate the environmental and economic impact of a liberalized cabotage regime. 
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1.0 Introduction 
 
Taiichi Ohno (1912-1990) championed a unique way of improving efficiency at the Toyota 
Motor Company based on the identification of muda, or waste (Womack and Jones, 2003). Just 
as engineers quantify the strength of materials by their molecular properties, “lean thinking” 
reveals why some supply chains are weaker than others. As waste is identified and eliminated, 
supply chains become more efficient and cost effective.    
The evolution of supply chain value analysis has shifted from a narrow perspective 
related solely to costs to include broader concepts such as sustainability. For example, the focus 
of the 1980’s was on lean production. In the 1990’s, the concept of agility was used to determine 
how responsive supply chains were to market shifts and disruption. Today, attention is focused 
on a product’s “carbon footprint”. This is leading to the development of green supply chains.  As 
a result, another industry acronym can be added to the lexicon: lean, green and agile supply 
chains, or LEGRA.    
Repositioning transportation equipment without a payload is one such waste. It consumes 
system capacity and the fuel burned generates unnecessary greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.  
But market imbalances dictate that a certain percentage of empty equipment movements are 
unavoidable. In industry terms this is called “deadhead” backhaul and becomes more pronounced 
when regulations constrain the flexibility of supply chain networks.   
A significant proportion of retail goods from offshore arrive in North America in 20 and 
40 foot marine containers; the standard for international marine shipping. As of 2008, there are 
over 14 million containers worldwide, owned or leased by international marine container 
carriers. Once an import load is discharged in Canada, it seems logical to use empty marine 
containers in domestic service if control of the equipment is by a Canadian carrier.  In regulatory 
terms, this is a form of cabotage and Canadian customs regulations restrict the use of empty 
foreign containers for domestic loads under strict conditions.    
This paper examines the impact of the cabotage regime on the movement of international 
containers in Canadian domestic service and how these regulations influence supply chain 
efficiencies. The discussion begins with a historical perspective and theoretical underpinning, 
followed by a comparison of North American container regulations. A review of global reforms 
and contemporary perspectives on cabotage regulations is provided, followed by a chronology of 
Canadian container regulatory reform. An economic framework and method of analysis is 
presented for examining three case studies to illustrate the environmental and economic impact 
of a liberalized cabotage regime. 
 
2.0 Historical and Theoretical Foundation 
 
The word cabotage that comes from the French verb, caboter, and Spanish word, cabo, meaning 
“along the cape”. It refers to ocean pick-up and delivery of goods along a coastline. Centuries 
ago, ships from northern Europe en route to the Mediterranean Sea would stop along the Atlantic 
coast to drop off and pick up cargo and passengers, making their trips more profitable. In an 
effort to protect their own shipping and ship building industries, the Portuguese restricted this 
practice to vessels that were locally owned and operated. As a result, they were the first to 
develop laws to prohibit cabotage. Nations that subsequently adopted similar laws were 
motivated by a desire to protect their nation’s merchant fleet from competition and therefore, 
their economic sovereignty. 
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In an age of globalization, many are questioning both the relevancy of cabotage 
restrictions generally and government’s role in maintaining container regulations, specifically.  
Bonsor (1984) and Stigler (1971) note that regardless of government’s initial intentions, in 
establishing a regulatory agency, over time the agency can become “captive” to the industry it 
regulates. Bonsor cites cases where regulators were made up of individuals from the companies 
they intend to regulate. Kahn (1971) has observed that when regulators are responsible for the 
performance of an industry, the desire to protect the health of that industry and the companies 
they regulate soon follows, becoming a moral hazard. Regulatory protections, rather than 
competition become the instruments to assure performance. Ultimately, economic regulation can 
lead to inefficiency and waste. 
The U.S. Jones Act is perhaps the most recognized transportation example of capture 
theory. The American marine and shipbuilding sectors are shielded from global competition by 
various Jones Act protections behind a wall of Washington lobbyists. The protection provided by 
the Jones Act has artificially nurtured the American marine shipping and shipbuilding sectors, 
under the guise of military necessity. Canadian container cabotage regulations, on the other hand, 
are a contradictory form of domestic market protection, given the Canadian container 
manufacturing industry is practically extinct.    
Public inertia prevents timely regulatory reform, and can take decades to overcome. In 
the case of cabotage, such regulations have been a part of North American history since 1651; 
enshrined in the Navigation Acts, regulating the shipping of goods in Great Britain and its 
colonies by restricting trade to British and colonial ships. While cabotage became a regulated 
activity in ocean vessel shipping through the restrictions of foreign-flagged vessels on a 
particular coastline, the term came to be used to describe all forms of domestic transportation 
services that use foreign-owned equipment or conveyances. As alternative modes of 
transportation developed, similar protection was transferred to them. Interestingly, cabotage is 
not restricted by any specific law; it is prohibited by Customs rules and by Immigration and 
Employment regulations.  
  
2.1 Container Cabotage in North America 
Canadian Customs tariff 9801.10.00 governs the use of foreign-owned marine containers 
in Canada, and limits the time containers can remain in Canada to 30 days. If the container 
remains in Canada past the time allowed, it must be imported with the appropriate duties paid. 
Also, 9801 restricts the use of foreign containers for domestic shipments to only one trip in the 
direction of the port where it arrived. The container must exit through the port of arrival as well.  
No backtracking off the direct route is allowed between domestic points and speculative moves 
of empty containers are also prohibited. Essentially, foreign-owned containers are prevented 
from carrying domestic cargo – the practice known as cabotage.     
An amendment to the rule, (Canada Customs Memo D3-7-1) allows containers to remain 
in the country for up to six months provided the carrier is a registered “pool” operator. But these 
companies must participate in the Customs Post Audit System and allow officials to audit their 
records (Vido and Kosior, 2001). The limitation to one domestic move remains the most 
restrictive operationally.     
The United States has more liberal rules governing the use of international containers.  
The U.S. allows containers to remain in the country for one year (as opposed to 30 days) and 
containers are allowed to move around freely, without geographic restrictions provided the 
carrier is U.S.-based. Foreign containers are free to exit the U.S. through any American port.  
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Essentially, foreign containers are viewed by the Americans as “steel packaging” and are 
described as such under NAFTA regulations.   
 By comparison, the rigid Canadian regulations prohibit efficient repositioning of 
containers to pick up loads in inland locations within Canada, raising costs, consuming system 
capacity, and discouraging formation of intermediaries, like the Non-Vessel Operating Common 
Carriers (NVOCC) who provide services for the U.S. transportation industry. Furthermore, ocean 
carriers that serve both Canadian and American ports must follow two sets of rules for what they 
should view as one market. A segmented marketplace makes operating container equipment in 
Canada less desirable relative to the U.S (Vido, 2004).   
Foreign containers with domestic U.S. loads from point to point in the United States are 
considered “in-transit” if traversing Canadian territory. The proviso was meant to accommodate 
Alaskan bound traffic, but now applies to general continental U.S. movements over Canadian 
territory. Similar movements are not allowed under Canadian cabotage law. No incidental 
domestic use is allowed when a foreign container transports goods from a point outside Canada 
in transit through Canada to another point outside Canada (i.e., U.S.-Canada-U.S.). Similarly, no 
incidental domestic use is allowed when a foreign container transports goods from a point in 
Canada in transit through a foreign territory to another point in Canada (i.e., Canada-U.S.– 
Canada). 
Given the flexibility that container lines have when operating their equipment in the U.S., 
container lines may prefer to position their equipment in U.S. rather than Canada. This could put 
Canadian shippers at a competitive disadvantage relative to U.S. shippers.  
 
2.2 Cabotage Reforms: Global Evidence 
The European Union first began cabotage liberalization in 1999 to slow the drift of the EU fleet 
towards “flags of convenience”; countries that are far more attractive to ship-owners than Europe 
in terms of taxation, social legislation and safety or environmental standards. From 1985 to 1995, 
employment of seafarers on EU-flagged ships fell by 37 percent, while the number from non-EU 
countries rose by 14 percent over the same period. In 1970, 32 percent of world trade sailed 
under an EU flag whereas just 13 percent in 2000 sailed under EU flags (Tyrinopoulos, 2005). 
A major obstacle to reform is a belief that cabotage prohibitions preserve domestic 
maritime know-how and employment. Critics of cabotage restrictions claim that such laws fail to 
achieve the goal of protecting a country’s shipping capability, and simply increase costs of 
domestic shippers.  Restricting cabotage is unlikely to assure domestic transport capability nor 
inhibit excessive foreign influence in domestic transport services (Hubner 2003).     
Although limited data is available in the European case regarding cargo falling under 
cabotage restrictions, carriers and governments agree that its importance in terms of seaborne 
trade volumes is limited and constitutes more of an irritant than a major problem (Hubner, 2003).   
 
3.0 Chronology of Canadian Container Regulatory Amendments 
 
In 2001, a small scale university study questioned the relevancy of Canadian customs regulations 
as they pertain to container movements. This qualitative work examined the relevance in 
retaining such policies, evaluated their impact on supply chain efficiencies and was the earliest 
examination of container cabotage in Canada (Vido, Prentice and Kosior, 2001). Vido (2004) 
quantified the impact on agricultural supply chains using a gravity model. While the analysis 
calculated a $10 million export sales loss to lentil producers, the case study suggested that 
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container cabotage was even more costly to Canada in terms of reduced transportation network 
efficiencies and capacity, which negatively affects all shippers.  
A 2005 study sponsored by Transport Canada further quantified the impact of container 
cabotage restrictions in terms of transportation capacity, efficiencies and emissions reductions, 
using three case studies.  In each case, carbon emissions were reduced due to a reduction of 
empty miles, increased supply chain speed and improved efficiencies (Prentice and Kosior, 
2005).   
In 2006, the Canadian Senate held hearings on intermodal transportation and container 
cabotage.  Evidence given for limiting cabotage and the number of days that a container can 
remain in Canada is an issue of maintaining tax equity between foreign and domestic suppliers of 
containers, and if regulations are not in place, the incentive would be to acquire containers from 
outside the country. However, no data were provided to support this claim. The regulations have 
been in existence for at least 30 years and likely introduced in the early 1970’s when 
containerized international trade arrived in Canada.  The suggestion is that truck trailer 
manufacturers sought protection from the new threat (Canadian Senate, Oct. 17, 2006).      
Prentice and Kosior, (2005) report anecdotally that Canadian container cabotage 
restrictions may not effectively protect domestic manufacturers from foreign competition, in any 
case. For example, the world’s container fleets are largely manufactured in China, whose cost 
structures make domestically-manufactured container equipment uncompetitive. Even with 
potential tariff walls as high as 100%, containers manufactured in China can sell at 50% the price 
of a container manufactured domestically. Further evidence provided at the Canadian Senate 
hearings failed to quantify the effectiveness of regulation 9801, both in terms of amount of 
federal revenues collected under the tariff and the number of violations reported annually. 
Moreover, Canada (and the U.S. for that matter) does not have an efficient tracking system to 
monitor violators and that even if such a system were in place and capable, benefits of enforcing 
the regulation would not be worth the effort and greater benefits to the economy would be 
derived from repealing the legislation.  
In 2008, the Canadian Senate Committee on Communications and Transportation 
presented its report to the Canadian Parliament that recommended tariff 9801 be repealed and 
harmonized with U.S. container regulations (Canadian Senate Committee, June 2008). On 
February 7, 2009, the federal government published proposed changes to the Customs Tariff 
governing foreign-owned containers in the Canada Gazette, Part 1. Interested parties were 
invited to make submissions on the proposed changes by April 2009. The Canadian federal 
review received several submissions in favour of reform and only one in opposition. Those most 
likely to express opposition to cabotage reform include labour groups, some domestic trucking 
interests and consolidators that have built businesses around the use/movements of domestic 
containers. These groups could face more competition because of an increased supply of 
international containers that would be used for domestic services. 
On December 15, 2009, the Canadian parliament passed Bill C51 Economic Recovery Act 
(Stimulus bill) that included amendments to customs tariff 9801. Containers within Canada are 
now allowed multiple domestic loads within a 365 day window, consistent with American 
regulations. However, “in-transit” moves are still prohibited (i.e.: U.S.-Canada-U.S. and Canada-
U.S.-Canada). Furthermore, containers cannot be moved into Canada “on-spec” and must have a 
booked import or export load. As such, the amendments only partially harmonize with U.S. 
regulations and do not create a single North American container network.     
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4.0 Economic Framework and Method of Analysis 
 
Full capacity is always greater than effective capacity. A container train with 400 containers has 
an effective capacity of 75 percent if 100 of these containers are empty. Figure 1 shows the 
theoretical economic framework and rationale for cabotage reforms. If cabotage restrictions are 
an explanation for why these containers are empty and the regulations no longer fulfill their 
original intent, then opportunity exists to increase system efficiency and reduce emissions. 
 
Figure 1 
Improved welfare from cabotage deregulation 
 
 
For freight movement, Q is usually represented by tonnes (or tonne-kilometres) and for 
this analysis will assume to consist of total system volume (headhaul plus backhaul) with P as 
the corresponding price per unit.  The solid lines represent Marginal Social Costs (MSCreg) and 
Marginal Private Costs (MPCreg) under cabotage regulation with Marginal Social Benefits 
(demand plus any positive externalities) represented by the solid line in the opposite direction.  
The triangle ABC represents the deadweight loss of GHG emissions at the regulated market 
equilibrium of Q and P.     
Under a deregulated regime (i.e. full cabotage), market efficiencies are gained in two 
ways, first the system is streamlined (less equipment to move same freight volume), and/or the 
price reduced from market competition. Assuming that the saving is passed on to shippers with a 
price change from P to P’; the total freight demand would increase from Q to Q’. MPCdereg and 
MSCdereg represent the reduced private resources and emissions reductions under a more efficient 
system and both shift downwards. The new equilibrium at P’Q’ would have a deadweight loss of 
DEF. The net environmental benefit would be the difference between ABC and DEF for reduced 
GHG tonnage.   
The theoretical analysis examines the container system in isolation from other modes (primarily 
bulk) and assumes market demand is price elastic and backhaul opportunities exist. But, the 
system will realize incremental volume from concomitant activity from bulk modal shift as 
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prices fall. Presumably, this may have efficiency gains for bulk systems if smaller shipments 
move to container along with potential for reduced fuel consumption and emissions. The theory 
can be tested using case studies of actual container shipments. But micro-level analysis provides 
only an indication of the potential benefits of eliminating waste in the system. Case studies 
cannot be aggregated to determine the holistic energy savings on a network scale.  Nevertheless, 
case studies can illustrate the inefficiency inherent in the current system and provide a 
quantification of the general range of direct environmental benefits. The case studies described in 
this paper are based on the environmental impacts of utilizing backhaul opportunities for 40-foot 
reefer containers.   
 Two formulas for fuel consumption will be utilized, one for truck and one for rail 
since fuel cost (based on consumption and per litre price) is a major cost component for carriers. 
Carbon dioxide, a major constituent of Green House Gas (GHG) emissions is proportional to fuel 
burned by the conversion factors of 2.4 kg/litre for gasoline and 2.7 kg/litre for diesel 
respectively (EPA, 2005). Three case studies are modeled in this analysis. The identities of the 
firms are hidden but the data are derived from actual shipping histories. The shipments are 
exports of meat products and seafood, the imports and domestic movements are those of a large 
merchandiser. Rail is the predominant mode for long haul transport in the first cases, but some 
short haul trucking is involved because the shipper is located in a city without an intermodal 
ramp. The third case involves long haul trucking from Toronto to St. John’s Newfoundland. Rail 
could be used for part of this shipment, but for expediency the standard modus operandi is truck.   
Railway fuel consumption is measured in average litres of diesel fuel consumed per 
metric tonne kilometre (L/T-KM)1. The estimate for average fuel consumption in Canada is 
0.0057 L/T-KM. The volume of fuel consumed by incremental railcars, containers or cargo 
consignments is calculated by multiplying the added tonnes by the distance hauled times the fuel 
consumption estimate. In economic terms, this is the marginal fuel cost for each additional tonne 
carried.  Some subtle fuel consumption differences are observed between eastern and western 
train movements, but this calculation is suitable for the micro-analysis case studies of average 
train operations2.   
For truck movements, the fuel consumption for each container carried by a tractor-trailer 
unit is fully allocated to the conveyance.  In other words, each container has a dedicated power 
unit (the tractor-trailer) assigned to it for the trip3. Figure 2 shows the fuel efficiency of trucking 
with respect to gross vehicle weight (GVW).  The equation is standardized for a highway speed 
of 105 KMH. The corridors are assumed to have less than 10 percent idling in the data mix.  The 
general equation that is derived from Tardif (2000) and Ash (2001) shows a “fixed” cost from 
tire rolling resistance and a “variable” cost due to wind resistance that is an inverse curve as 
GVW increases4.  
An argument can be made that for both truck and rail operations, fuel consumption for 
two tonnes of freight hauled one kilometre is not the same as one tonne hauled two kilometres. 
While both are two tonne-kilometres of haulage, fuel consumed would be different. Subtle 
                                                 
1 Email correspondence with Marie Houde, Director of Network Strategies, CN Rail. 
2 A network approach would require the use of the Davis railway propulsion formula for train operations. 
3 In the case of rail operations, the train will still move between points in a corridor whether 300 or 400 containers 
are full. 
4 The Davis railway formula does follow an inverse relationship as well, but since modern trains are long and heavy, 
fuel consumption is “way down” the inverse curve and can be considered linear for all intents and purposes. 
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differences arise from operational considerations such as fuel burn during acceleration and wheel 
rolling resistance. But since we are using case studies with medium to long haul ranges, these 
differences are immeasurable. The Davis (Iwnicki, 2006), Tardif (2000) and Ash (2001) 
formulas for fuel consumption used in this paper are based on energy to move weight, and while 
engine technologies have improved since the formulas were first derived, they are adequate for 
the illustrative purposes of this study. 
  Figure 2 
Truck fuel consumption   
 
As of 2004, the Canadian federal government is engaged in a multi-year study called the 
Full Cost Investigation (FCI) initiative where both aggregate and unit costs of transportation 
modes are being determined. Over 33 reports are available for researchers and government 
officials for conducting economic analysis including monetizing elements such as emissions and 
noise (Transport Canada, 2009). However, these reports are for the base case year of 2000, and 
several are currently being updated for year 2006, so formulas used in this paper remain current 
until the updates are complete.        
 
4.1 Case 1 - Meat Export and Generic Domestic Movement 
The first case presents a 40-foot refrigerated container movement of frozen meat from Brandon, 
Manitoba to the Port of Vancouver.  In order to ship a full container from Manitoba, an empty 
container must be positioned at the Brandon plant. The fronthaul shipment is represented as a 
solid heavy black line in Figure 3. The empty backhaul repositioning move is designated as the 
broken black line.  Together, this fronthaul-backhaul combination completes the cycle which is 
designated as Loop 1 for the remainder of the analysis with trip summary in Table 1.  
The round trip distance of Loop 1 includes transhipment at Winnipeg. The rail legs are 
2,232 km between Vancouver and Winnipeg, and the truck haul is 200 km between Winnipeg 
and Brandon, for a total of 4,864 km. The rail legs take three days each way.   
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Figure 3 
Meat export and domestic move 
 
 
Table 1 
Loop 1 – meat export 
 
 
Table 2 
Loop 2 – domestic move 
 
 
 
The dwell period in the Winnipeg intermodal yard is two days.  The 200 km road trip 
from the intermodal yard to the Brandon plant dock and the administration of documents takes 
six hours complete. Wait times are minimized because the product is perishable. Loading the 
container with meat is estimated at 12 hours. Dwell time at the Port of Vancouver is estimated at 
three days.   
In summary, the transit time is 7 days and dwell periods equal 7.5 days for a total cycle 
time of 14.5 days. The transit and dwell estimations assume a 24/7 schedule with no weekend 
layover. The last actual loading time is Friday afternoon because the plant does not operate over 
the weekend.  Only the marginal fuel required to move the empty container between Vancouver 
and Winnipeg is considered because the train is a scheduled run. The movement of an empty 40-
bfoot reefer container between Vancouver and Winnipeg uses 50.6 litres of fuel. This is less than 
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the fuel consumed on the short haul truck trip between Brandon and Winnipeg. The fuel required 
to move the tractor and container chassis is 49.2 litres with an additional 2.8 required to move 
the empty container for a total of 52.0 litres. 
On the fronthaul trip, the fuel requires 69.5 litres to move the truck with 25 tonnes of 
cargo.  The marginal fuel required to move the cargo is 17.5 litres. The rail fronthaul requires an 
additional 368.7 litres of fuel to move the cargo.  In total Loop 1 consumes a total of 540.8 litres 
of diesel fuel and produces 1,460.2 kilograms of CO2.  
Loop 2 in Figure 3 is designated by light grey lines and represents an unrelated domestic 
shipment between Vancouver and Winnipeg with trip summary in Table 2. The interpretation is 
the same as for Loop 1 with a solid line for a full movement, and the broken line is an empty 
return.  There is no short haul truck trip to Brandon. The five day dwell time in Winnipeg 
represents 2 days in the rail yard, 1 day to a consignee’s dock unload and release of the 
container, then another two days waiting for a train. Loop 2 takes 11 days to complete, consumes 
419.3 litres of fuel and produces 1,132.1 kilograms of CO2.  
Loop 3 in Figure 4 represents the merger of Loop 1 and Loop 2 in an ideal situation when 
the two shippers can co-ordinate movements with results shown in Table 3. The distance for the 
total circuit is 4,864 kms – the same as for Loop 1 with the difference that the inbound rail move 
from Vancouver to Winnipeg now includes the domestic cargo. The total time for the Loop 3 
circuit is 15.5 days, or one day longer than Loop 1. The additional day is to unload the domestic 
cargo at the consignee’s dock in Winnipeg.  The only empty movement is from Winnipeg to 
Brandon. Fuel consumption is 858.9 litres for the complete circuit with 2,319.0 kilograms of CO2 
produced.    
Figure 4 
Combining meat export with domestic move 
 
 
 
Table 3 
Loop 3 – combined meat export and domestic move under cabotage 
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The cabotage movement eliminates 4,464 kilometres of empty container travel.  
Coordination of the circuit eliminates two long haul empty moves. The combined circuit frees up 
space to move another full cycle.  The net time reduction in the merged Loop 3 is 10 days 
consisting of 6 days of transit time and 4 days of dwell time removed from the logistics pipeline.  
The combined circuit saves 101.2 litres of fuel and reduces 273.2 kilograms of CO2 emissions.   
 
4.2 Case 2 – Meat Export and Imported Merchandise Distribution  
In this scenario, the meat export case designated Loop 1 is used in a merged circuit with the 
operations of an imported general merchandise distributor. In Figure 5 the merchandise retailer 
operation is designated as Loop 4 with data for each leg shown in Table 4.  
The merchandise retailer normally transloads import freight from 40-foot international 
containers to 53-foot domestic containers at Vancouver to gain extra volume. It is assumed that 
the inbound freight is dense and “weighs out” before utilizing all available container volume, 
thereby negating the need for trans-loading. The analysis assumes that the distributor is able to 
separate heavy goods (pumps, rakes, shovels, etc.) from light goods (plastics, toys, household 
sundries) at the origin and use a 40-foot reefer container to bring their products to a Toronto 
warehouse. 
 
Figure 5 
Meat export with import merchandise retailer 
 
 
Table 4 
Loop 4 – import merchandise retailer move 
 
 
 
The inbound leg for the importer from Vancouver to Toronto by rail is 4,464 kilometres.  
It is estimated to take 7 days by rail and consume 737.4 litres of fuel. The Toronto dwell time of 
5 days includes removing the container from the rail yard and transfer to a Toronto area 
warehouse where it is destuffed and reloaded with a domestic load for stores in Western Canada.    
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The second leg involves moving the domestic load to Saskatoon, which is a 
representative mid-Western Canadian point. Toronto to Saskatoon is 2,957 kilometres and the 
trip consumes 488.5 litres at an estimated 5 days by rail.  The dwell time in Saskatoon is 5 days, 
similar to the dwell times for the previous loops.  The empty leg to Vancouver from Saskatoon is 
1,667 kilometres and takes an estimated 3 days by rail consuming about 37.8 litres of fuel. No 
well time is assigned to the container when it returns to Vancouver because it is placed back into 
the pool. The total circuit is 9,088 kilometres, taking 25 days to complete, using 1,263.7 litres of 
fuel and producing 3,412.0 kilograms of CO2 emissions.   
In Figure 6, Loop 5 is the combined operation of the merchandise importer and the meat 
exporter with trip data shown in Table 5. If the two shippers collaborated, the first half of 
merchandiser’s logistics to Saskatoon is retained, and at that point the empty 40-foot reefer 
container is turned over to the meat exporter. An 829-kilometre leg from Saskatoon to Winnipeg, 
saving 838 empty kilometres, replaces the Saskatoon to Vancouver empty leg. This also 
eliminates the Vancouver to Winnipeg empty leg in Loop 1. The Saskatoon to Winnipeg leg 
takes about 2 days by rail with a dwell time of 2 days. Once the container is removed from the 
Winnipeg rail terminal, the latter portion of the meat exporter logistics pipeline prevails. 
 
Figure 6 
Combining meat exporter with import merchandise retailer 
 
 
 
Table 5 
Loop 5 – Combined meat export and merchandise retailer move under cabotage 
 
 
 
Table 5 shows that 1,734.9 litres of fuel is consumed while producing 4,684.2 kilograms 
of CO2 emissions. The combined circuit eliminates 3,070 empty kilometres of wasted rail 
capacity with 4 days of time removed from the combined circuits.  Fuel savings amount to 69.6 
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litres while reducing 187.9 kilograms of CO2 emissions. Only the dwell time savings are 
neutralized since they are the same for the separate and combined loops, and therefore no 
benefits are realized in terms of rail yard congestion savings. 
Loop 5 takes about 35.5 days to complete, and thus, the longer time to finish the 
combined circuit exceeds the 30-day time limit currently stipulated in cabotage regulations. In 
addition, the “backtrack” from Saskatoon to Brandon under the literal interpretation of the 
regulations is prohibited.   
 
4.3 Case 3 – Sea Food Export and Import Merchandise Distribution 
Trucking is the standard conveyance between Newfoundland and central Canada because the 
island has no railway. Figure 7 maps out the route from Toronto by truck to North Sydney, Nova 
Scotia and ferry to Newfoundland. Tables 6 and 7 provide the supply chain data for a 
merchandise retailer (Loop 6) and a seafood exporter (Loop 7).  
 
Figure 7 
Merchandise retailer with seafood exporter 
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Table 6 
Loop 6 – merchandise retailer in St. John’s, NL 
  
 
 
For Loop 6, the 2,013-kilometre truck journey takes 2 days and consumes 700 litres of 
fuel. If timed correctly, the truck has about a half day of wait time for the Marine Atlantic ferry 
to Argentia. The 518 kilometre ferry crossing takes 17 hours.  This is the shortest time route to 
St. John’s and uses 107 litres of fuel. The fuel calculation includes the tare weight of the truck 
and cargo carried by the ferry.  At Argentia, the truck travels 131-kilometers to St. John’s and 
uses 45.5 litres of fuel. The trip takes 12 hours and the container has a three day turnaround time 
in St. John’s. 
Table 7 
Loop 7 – seafood exporter movement 
 
 
 
For Loop 6, it is assumed that no arrangements have been made to co-ordinate a backhaul 
load and the container returns empty. The truck to Argentia consumes 34.1 litres of fuel, the 
ferry to North Sydney uses 43.5 litres of fuel and truck to Toronto takes 523 litres of fuel. Return 
transit times are the same, with no dwell times. At Toronto, the container re-enters the pool. No 
dwell time is assigned in the model.  Loop 6 takes 10.5 days to complete (6.5 days in transit, 4 
days dwell). The distance is 5,324 kilometres with 1,453 litres of fuel burned and produces 
3,923.1 kilograms of CO2 emissions.   
Loop 7 is essentially the reverse of Loop 6. The export move requires an empty container 
to be trucked from Halifax to St. John’s where it is loaded with seafood. Loop 7 takes 11 days to 
complete with 5 days in transit and 6 days dwell time. Transit is 1.5 days less but two days of 
extra dwell time when compared to Loop 6. The total distance is 3,740 kilometres and 1,041.2 
litres of fuel are consumed.  
Figure 8 shows Loop 8 that utilizes a fully loaded two-way move from Toronto to St. 
John’s and return with trip data in Table 8. The total distance for this circuit is 5,324 kilometres 
requiring 13.5 days (6.5 in-transit, 7 dwell) to complete, burns 1,704 litres of fuel and produces 
4,600.8 kilograms of CO2 emissions 
The waste eliminated in Case 3 is 3,740 empty container miles and GHG emissions from 
790 litres of fuel. Trucking accounts of 80.5 percent of the GHG emissions.  Additional 
utilization for the system is equal to 8 days (5 in-transit, 3 dwell) 
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Figure 8 
Loop 8 – Combining merchandise retailer with seafood exporter 
 
 
 
Table 8 
Loop 8 – combining seafood exporter with merchandise retailer to St. John’s, NL 
 
 
.   
 
4.4 Summary 
The data from the three case studies are summarized in Table 9. Amended container cabotage 
laws could increase transport system capacity and reduced fuel consumption. In all cases 
transport capacity is increased in terms of empty equipment days in transit and dwell times at 
terminals. The most dramatic fuel savings is Case 3 that combines merchandise imports from 
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Toronto with St. John’s seafood exports. The fuel saving is 790 litres with 2,133 kilograms of 
carbon emissions eliminated.  
The least dramatic change is Case 2 in which only 70 litres of fuel are saved. Under 
existing law, this case violates the 30-day time limit for containers to remain duty-free and would 
require special dispensation. In Case 1 the additional efficiency gain is precluded because a 
second domestic move is not allowed in the regulations. On an aggregate basis, the three case 
studies eliminate over 11,000 kilometres of extra travel, shave 22 days from the collective supply 
chains, burns 961 litres less fuel and produces 2.6 metric tons less carbon emissions.     
 
Table 9 
Summary of case study results 
 
 
 
5.0 Conclusion 
 
In every scenario empty backhauls can be eliminated and fuel consumption can be reduced. The 
modeling analysis corroborated statements by industry spokespersons that equipment cycle time 
for combined operations would be greater than the 30 day limit, thus precluding synergies from 
logistical partnerships. However, added capacity from reduced empty movements is an 
immediate, tangible reality from amended regulations. While the micro-analysis suggests that 
cabotage regulations would improve capacity and reduce fuel consumption, a broader national 
network modeling effort would provide further evidence on the full impacts of amended 
regulations. 
Leaner supply chains are known to have economic benefits, but environmental benefits of 
lean thinking are less known. The modeling presented here does not represent the worst cases. 
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The (preceding) 30-day limit was not viewed as negatively as the inability to backtrack or 
restrictions on the repositioning of empty containers without confirmed loads. Space does not 
allow for these examples, but the results are generally the same. Greater flexibility in the use of 
international containers for domestic traffic increase rail network capacity and reduces GHG 
emissions. 
Despite the passing of Bill C-51 Economic Recovery (Stimulus bill) on December 15, 
2009, in where the 30 day limit has been extended to 365 days and multiple moves are now 
allowed, amendments only partially address the needs. The third requirement, where containers 
with domestic loads from point to point in Canada can traverse American soil (and vice versa) 
was not liberalized. Although closer to mirroring the more permissive U.S. Customs regulations 
that treat containers as if they are “re-usable packaging” rather than a foreign vehicle, Canadian 
customs regulations still do not fully address the need of treating North America as an integrated 
market.      
While the revised regulations require a network economic and environmental impact 
assessment, further work is needed to determine benefits of complete harmonization with 
American container cabotage vis-à-vis removal of the final restriction on “in-transit” movements.  
. 
References 
 
Ash, Lloyd, (2001) Operating costs of trucks in Canada 2001. Prepared for Transport Canada, 
Economic Analysis Directorate.  
Bonsor, Norman, (1983) Transportation economics: theory and Canadian policy. Toronto: 
Butterworths.  
Canadian Senate Committee on Transport and Communications Report, Time for a New 
National Vision: Opportunities and Constraints for Canada in the Global Movement of 
Goods, June 2008.  
Canadian Senate Committee on Transport and Communications, Study on Containerized Traffic 
Handled by Canadian Ports: Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Transport 
and Communications, Issue 4 - Evidence - October 17, 2006.   
Canadian Senate Committee on Transport and Communications, Study on Containerized Traffic 
Handled by Canadian Ports: Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Transport 
and Communications, Issue 4 - Evidence - October 26, 2006.   
Canadian Senate Committee on Transport and Communications, Study on Containerized Traffic 
Handled by Canadian Ports: Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Transport 
and Communications, Issue 4 - Evidence – November 1, 2006.   
Canadian Senate Committee on Transport and Communications, Study on Containerized Traffic 
Handled by Canadian Ports: Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Transport 
and Communications, Issue 4 - Evidence – June 20, 2006.   
Hubner, Wolfgang, (2003) Regulatory issues in international maritime transport. Prepared for the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Directorate for 
Science, Technology and Industry, Division of Transport. 
Iwnicki, Simon, (2006) Handbook of railway vehicle dynamics. London: Taylor and Francis. 
Kahn, Alfred, (1971) The economics of regulation: principals and institutions, vol II: 
institutional issues. New York: John Wiley and Sons. 
Stigler, G. (1971) The theory of economic regulation, Bell Journal of Economics and 
Management Science, 2: 1-16.  
43  
Canadian Journal of Transportation                Volume 3, Part 1 
 44 
Tardif, Louis, (2000) Fuel efficiency benchmarking in Canada’s trucking industry: results of an 
industry survey. Prepared for the Office of Energy Efficiency, Natural Resources Canada. 
Transport Canada, (2009) http://www.tc.gc.ca/policy/aca/menu.htm. Accessed 12 January, 2010. 
Tyrinopoulos, Yannis (2005) Factors affecting competitiveness of intermodal and maritime 
transport. Prepared for the European Union, Euro-Aid Cooperation Office, Project 
ASIMAR (Assistance in Intermodal and Marine Transport), Deliverable D3.2. 
United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Office of Transportation and Air Quality 
“Average Carbon Dioxide Emissions Resulting from Gasoline and Diesel Fuel” Bulletin No. 
EPA420-F-05-001, February 2005. 
Vido, Erica, (2004) Container cabotage policy and its impact on Western Canadian pulse 
exports: a gravity model approach. M.Sc. Thesis, University of Manitoba. 
Vido, Erica and J. Kosior, (2001) An assessment of North American cabotage laws: the carriage 
of goods in marine containers. Proceedings of the 36th Annual Meeting of the Canadian 
Transportation Research Forum. 
Vido, Erica, B. Prentice and J. Kosior, (2001) An assessment of North American container 
cabotage regulations: the impact on Canadian operations. University of Manitoba 
Transport Institute. 
Womack, James P. and Daniel T. Jones, (2003). Lean Thinking - Banish Waste and create wealth 
in your corporation. New York: Free Press. 
 
